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Introduction 
In his notebooks the painter Paul Klee repeatedly insisted, and demonstrated by 
example, that the processes of genesis and growth that give rise to forms in the 
world we inhabit are more important than the forms themselves. ‘Form is the 
end, death’, he wrote. ‘Form-giving is movement, action. Form-giving is life’ 
(Klee 1973: 269). This, in turn, lay at the heart of his celebrated ‘Creative Credo’ 
of 1920: ‘Art does not reproduce the visible but makes visible’ (Klee 1961: 76). It 
does not, in other words, seek to replicate finished forms that are already 
settled, whether as images in the mind or as objects in the world. It seeks, rather, 
to join with those very forces that bring form into being. Thus the line grows 
from a point that has been set in motion, as the plant grows from its seed. 
Taking their cue from Klee, philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari argue 
that the essential relation, in a world of life, is not between matter and form, or 
between substance and attributes, but between materials and forces (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2004: 377). It is about the way in which materials of all sorts, with 
various and variable properties, and enlivened by the forces of the Cosmos, mix 
and meld with one another in the generation of things. And what they seek to 
overcome in their rhetoric is the lingering influence of a way of thinking about 
things, and about how they are made and used, that has been around in the 
western world for the past two millennia and more. It goes back to Aristotle. 
 
To create any thing, Aristotle reasoned, you have to bring together form 
(morphe) and matter (hyle). In the subsequent history of western thought, this 
hylomorphic model of creation became ever more deeply embedded. But it also 
became increasingly unbalanced. Form came to be seen as imposed, by an agent 
with a particular end or goal in mind, while matter – thus rendered passive and 
inert – was that which was imposed upon. The critical argument I wish to 
develop is that contemporary discussions in fields ranging from anthropology 
and archaeology to art history and material culture studies continue to 
reproduce the underlying assumptions of the hylomorphic model even as they 
seek to restore the balance between its terms. My ultimate aim, however, is to 
overthrow the model itself, and to replace it with an ontology that assigns 
primacy to processes of formation as against their final products, and to flows 
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and transformations of materials as against states of matter. Form, to recall 
Klee’s words, is death; form-giving is life. My purpose, in short, is to restore to 
life a world that has been effectively killed off in the pronouncements of 
theorists for whom, in the words of one of their more prominent spokespersons, 
the road to understanding and empathy lies in ‘what people do with objects’ 
(Miller 1998: 19). 
 
My argument has five components, each of which corresponds to a key word in 
my title. First, I want to insist that the inhabited world is comprised not of 
objects but of things. I have therefore to establish a very clear distinction 
between things and objects. Secondly, I will establish what I mean by life, as the 
generative capacity of that encompassing field of relations within which forms 
arise and are held in place. I shall argue that the current emphasis, in much of 
the literature, on material agency is a consequence of the reduction of things to 
objects and of their consequent ‘falling out’ from the processes of life. Indeed, 
the more that theorists have to say about agency, the less they seem to have to 
say about life; I would like to put this emphasis in reverse. Thirdly, then, I will 
claim that a focus on life-processes requires us to attend not to materiality as 
such but to the fluxes and flows of materials. We are obliged, as Deleuze and 
Guattari say, to follow these flows, tracing the paths of form-generation, 
wherever they may lead. Fourth, I shall determine the specific sense in which 
movement along these paths is creative: this is to read creativity ‘forwards’, as 
an improvisatory joining in with formative processes, rather than ‘backwards’, as 
an abduction from a finished object to an intention in the mind of an agent. 
Finally, I shall show that the pathways or trajectories along which improvisatory 
practice unfolds are not connections, nor do they describe relations between 
one thing and another. They are rather lines along which things continually 
come into being. Thus when I speak of the entanglement of things I mean this 
literally and precisely: not a network of connections but a meshwork of 
interwoven lines of growth and movement.  
Objects and things 
Sitting alone in my study as I write, it may seem obvious that I am surrounded by 
objects of all sorts, from the chair and desk that support my body and my work, 
to the pad on which I write, the pen in my hand and the spectacles balanced on 
my nose. Imagine for a moment that every object in the room were magically to 
vanish, to leave only the bare floor, walls and ceiling. Short of standing or 
pacing the floorboards, I could do nothing. A room devoid of objects, we might 
reasonably conclude, is virtually uninhabitable. In order to make it ready for any 
activity, it has to be furnished. As the psychologist James Gibson argued, 
introducing his ecological approach to visual perception, the furnishings of a 
room comprise the affordances that enable residents to conduct their routine 
activities there: the chair affords sitting, the pen writing, the spectacles seeing, 
and so on. Rather more controversially, however, Gibson extended his reasoning 
from the interior space of the room to the environment in general. He asks us to 
imagine an open environment, ‘a layout consisting of the surface of the earth 
alone’ (Gibson 1979: 33). In the limiting case – that is, in the absence of any 
objects whatever – such an environment would be realised as a perfectly level 
desert, with the cloudless sky above and the solid earth beneath, stretching in all 
directions to the great circle of the horizon. What a desolate place that would 
be! Like the floorboards of the room, the surface of the earth affords only 
standing and walking. That we can do anything else besides depends on the fact 
that the open environment, like the interior room, is ordinarily cluttered with 
Realities Working Papers # 15: Bringing Things to Life 
 
July 2010  4 
 
objects. ‘The furniture of the earth’, writes Gibson, ‘like the furnishings of a 
room, is what makes it livable’ (1979: 78).  
 
Let us now leave the seclusion of the study and take a walk outside, in the open 
air. Our path takes us through a woodland thicket. Surrounded on all sides by 
trunks and branches, the environment certainly seems cluttered. But is it 
cluttered with objects? Suppose that we focus our attention on a particular tree. 
There it is, rooted in the earth, trunk rising up, branches splayed out, swaying in 
the wind, with or without buds or leaves, depending on the season. Is the tree, 
then, an object? If so, how should we define it? What is tree and what is not-
tree? Where does the tree end and the rest of the world begin? These questions 
are not easily answered – not as easily, at least, as they apparently are for the 
items of furniture in my study. Is the bark, for example, part of the tree? If I 
break off a piece in my hand and observe it closely, I will doubtless find that it is 
inhabited by a great many tiny creatures that have burrowed beneath it and 
made their homes there. Are they part of the tree? And what of the algae that 
grow on the outer surfaces of the trunk or the lichens that hang from the 
branches? Moreover, if we have decided that bark-boring insects belong as 
much to the tree as does the bark itself, then there seems no particular reason 
to exclude its other inhabitants, including the bird that builds its nest there or 
the squirrel for whom it offers a labyrinth of ladders and springboards. If we 
consider, too, that the character of this particular tree lies just as much in the 
way it responds to the currents of wind, in the swaying of its branches and the 
rustling of its leaves, then we might wonder whether the tree can be anything 
other than a tree-in-the-air. 
 
These considerations lead me to conclude that the tree is not an object at all, 
but a certain gathering together of the threads of life. That is what I mean by a 
thing. In this I follow – albeit rather loosely – the argument classically advanced 
by the philosopher Martin Heidegger. In his celebrated essay on The Thing, 
Heidegger was at pains to figure out precisely what makes a thing different 
from an object. The object stands before us as a fait accompli, presenting its 
congealed, outer surfaces to our inspection. It is defined by its very ‘over-
againstness’ in relation to the setting in which it is placed (Heidegger 1971: 167). 
The thing, by contrast, is a ‘going on’, or better, a place where several goings on 
become entwined. To observe a thing is not to be locked out but to be invited in 
to the gathering. We participate, as Heidegger rather enigmatically put it, in the 
thing’ thinging in a worlding world. There is of course a precedent for this view 
of the thing as a gathering in the ancient meaning of the word as a place where 
people would gather to resolve their affairs. If we think of every participant as 
following a particular way of life, threading a line through the world, then 
perhaps we could define the thing, as I have suggested elsewhere, as a 
‘parliament of lines’ (Ingold 2007a: 5). Thus conceived, the thing has the 
character not of an externally bounded entity, set over and against the world, 
but of a knot whose constituent threads, far from being contained within it, 
trail beyond, only to become caught with other threads in other knots. Or in a 
word, things leak, forever discharging through the surfaces that form 
temporarily around them. 
 
I shall return to this point in connection with the importance, which I discuss 
later, of following flows of materials. For now, let me continue with our walk 
outside. We have observed the tree; what else might catch our attention? I stub 
my foot on a stone lying on the path. Surely, you will say, the stone is an object. 
Yet it so only if we artificially excise it from the processes of erosion and 
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deposition that brought it there and lent it the size and shape that it presently 
has. A rolling stone, the proverb says, gathers no moss, yet in the very process of 
gathering moss, the stone that is wedged in place become a thing, while on the 
other hand the stone that rolls – like a pebble washed by a running river – 
becomes a thing in its very rolling. Just as the tree, responding in its movements 
to the currents of wind, is a tree-in-the-air, so the stone, rolling in the river 
current, is a stone-in-the-water. Suppose then that we cast our eyes upwards. It 
is a fine day, but there are a few clouds. Are clouds objects? Rather oddly, 
Gibson thinks they are: they seem to him to hang in the sky, while other entities 
like trees and stones lie on the earth. Thus the entire environment, in Gibson’s 
words, ‘consists of the earth and the sky with objects on the earth and in the 
sky’ (Gibson 1979: 66). The painter René Magritte cleverly parodied this view of 
the furnished sky by depicting the cloud as a flying object floating in through 
the open door of an otherwise empty room. Of course the cloud is not really an 
object but a vaporous tumescence that swells as it is carried along in currents of 
air. To observe the clouds, I would say, ‘is not to view the furniture of the sky 
but to catch a glimpse of the sky-in-formation, never the same from one 
moment to the next’ (Ingold 2007c: S28). Once again, clouds are not objects but 
things. 
 
What goes for such things as trees, stones and clouds, which may have grown or 
formed with little or no human intervention, also applies to more ostensibly 
artificial structures. Consider a building: not the fixed and final structure of the 
architect’s design but the actual building, resting on its foundations in the earth, 
buffeted by the elements, and susceptible to the visitations of birds, rodents and 
fungi. The distinguished Portuguese architect Alvaro Siza has admitted that he 
has never been able to build a real house, by which he mean ‘a complicated 
machine in which every day something breaks down’ (Siza 1997: 47). The real 
house is never finished. Rather, for its inhabitants it calls for unremitting effort 
to shore it up in the face of the comings and goings of its human inhabitants 
and non-human inhabitants, not to mention the weather! Rainwater drips 
through the roof where the wind has blown off a tile, feeding a fungal growth 
that threatens to decompose the timbers, the gutters are full of rotten leaves, 
and if that were not enough, moans Siza, ‘legions of ants invade the thresholds 
of doors, there are always the dead bodies of birds and mice and cats’. Indeed 
not unlike the tree, the real house is a gathering of lives, and to inhabit it is to 
join in the gathering, or in Heidegger’s terms, to participate with the thing in its 
thinging. Our most fundamental architectural experiences, as Juhani Pallasmaa 
explains, are verbal rather than nominal in form. They consist not of encounters 
with objects – the façade, door-frame, window and fireplace – but of acts of 
approaching and entering, looking in or out, and soaking up the warmth of the 
hearth (Pallasmaa 1996: 45). As inhabitants, we experience the house not as an 
object but as a thing.  
Life and agency 
What have we learned from throwing open the windows of the study, leaving 
the house and taking a walk outside? Have we encountered an environment 
that is as cluttered with objects as is my study with furniture, books and utensils? 
Far from it. Indeed there seem to be no objects at all. To be sure, there are 
swellings, growths, outcrops, filaments, ruptures and cavities, but not objects. 
Though we may occupy a world full of objects, to the occupant the contents of 
the world appear already locked into their final forms, closed in upon 
themselves. It is as though they had turned their backs on us. To inhabit the 
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world, by contrast, is to join in the processes of formation. And the world that 
thus opens up to inhabitants is fundamentally an environment without objects 
or, in short, an EWO. Describing the tree, the stone, the cloud and the building, I 
have sought to give an account of life in the EWO. Recall that for Gibson, an 
environment devoid of objects could be nothing but a featureless and perfectly 
level desert. Only when objects are added, whether laid out on the ground or 
hung up in the sky, does an environment – in his terms – become liveable. How, 
then, do we arrive at such a contrary conclusion, namely that an environment 
populated with objects can be occupied but not inhabited? What mark the 
difference between Gibson’s view and our own? The answer lies in our 
respective understandings of the significance of surfaces. 
 
It is by their outward surfaces, according to Gibson, that objects are revealed to 
perception. Every surface, as he explains, is an interface between the more or 
less solid substance of an object and the volatile medium that surrounds it. If the 
substance is dissolved or evaporates into the medium, then the surface 
disappears, and with it the object it once enveloped (Gibson 1979: 16, 106). Thus 
the very objectness of any entity lies in the separation and immiscibility of 
substance and medium. Remove every object, however, and a surface still 
remains – for Gibson the most fundamental surface of all – namely the ground, 
marking the interface between the substance of the earth below and the 
gaseous medium of the sky above. Has the earth, then, turned its back on the 
sky? If it had, then as Gibson correctly surmised, no life would be possible. The 
open environment could not be inhabited. Our argument, to the contrary, is 
that the world of the open can be inhabited precisely because, wherever life is 
going on, the interfacial separation of earth and sky gives way to mutual 
permeability and binding. For what we vaguely call the ground is not, in truth, a 
coherent surface at all but a zone in which the air and moisture of the sky 
combine with substances whose source lies in the earth in the ongoing 
formation of living things. Of a seed that has fallen to the ground, Paul Klee 
writes that ‘the relation to earth and atmosphere begets the capacity to grow … 
The seed strikes root, initially the line is directed earthwards, though not to 
dwell there, only to draw energy thence for reaching up into the air’ (Klee 1973: 
29). In growth, the point becomes a line, but the line, far from being mounted 
upon the pre-prepared surface of the ground, contributes to its ever-evolving 
weave.  
  
There could be no life, in short, in a world where earth and sky do not mix and 
mingle. For an impression of what it means to inhabit such an earth-sky world 
we can return to Heidegger. In an admittedly florid passage, he describes the 
earth as ‘the serving bearer, blossoming and fruiting, spreading out in rock and 
water, rising up into plant and animal’. And of the sky, he writes that it ‘is the 
vaulting path of the sun, the course of the changing moon, the wandering 
glitter of the stars, the year’s seasons and their changes, the lights and dusk of 
the day, the gloom and glow of the night, the clemency and inclemency of the 
weather, the drifting clouds and blue depth of the ether’. Moreover one cannot 
speak of the earth without already thinking of the sky, and vice versa. Each 
partakes of the essence of the other (Heidegger 1971: 149). How different this is 
from Gibson’s account of earth and sky as mutually exclusive domains, rigidly 
held apart at the ground surface, and populated with their respective objects: 
‘mountains and clouds, fires and sunsets, pebbles and stars’ (Gibson 1979: 66)! In 
place of Gibson’s nouns denoting items of furniture, Heidegger’s description is 
replete with verbs of growth and motion. In the earth’s ‘rising up’, as Heidegger 
puts it, in that irrepressible discharge of substance through the porous surfaces 
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of emergent forms, we find the essence of life. Things are alive, as I have noted 
already, because they leak. Life in the EWO will not be contained, but inheres in 
the very circulations of materials that continually give rise to the forms of things 
even as they portend their dissolution. 
  
It is through their immersion in these circulations, then, that things are brought 
to life. You can demonstrate this by means of a simple experiment, which I have 
carried out with my students at the University of Aberdeen. Using a square of 
paper, matchstick bamboo, ribbon, tape, glue and twine, it is easy to make a 
kite. We did this indoors, working on tables. It seemed, to all intents and 
purposes, that we were assembling an object. But when we carried our creations 
to a field outside, everything changed. They suddenly leaped into action, 
twirling, spinning, nose-diving, and – just occasionally – flying. So what had 
happened? Had some animating force magically jumped into the kites, causing 
them to act most often in ways we did not intend? Of course not. It was rather 
that the kites themselves were now immersed in the currents of the wind. The 
kite that had lain lifeless on the table indoors had become a kite-in-the-air. It 
was no longer an object, if indeed it ever was, but a thing. As the thing exists in 
its thinging, so the kite-in-the-air exists in its flying. Or to put it another way, at 
the moment it was taken out of doors, the kite ceased to figure in our 
perception as an object that can be set in motion, and became instead a 
movement that resolves itself into the form of a thing. One could say the same, 
indeed, of a bird-in-the-air, or of the fish-in-the-water. The bird is its flying; the 
fish its swimming. The bird can fly thanks to the currents and vortices that it sets 
up in the air, and the fish can swim at speed because of eddies set up through 
the swishing of its tail and fins. Cut out from these currents, they would be dead. 
  
This is the point at which we can tackle – and, I hope, bury once and for all – the 
so-called ‘problem of agency’ (Gell 1998: 16). Much has been written on the 
relations between people and objects, guided by the thought that the 
difference between them is far from absolute. If persons can act on objects in 
their vicinity, so, it is argued, can objects ‘act back’, causing them to do or 
allowing them to achieve what they otherwise could not (see, for example, 
Gosden 2005, Knappett 2005, Henare, Holbraad and Wastell [eds] 2007, Latour 
2005, Miller [ed] 2005, Tilley 2004, Malafouris and Knappett [eds] 2008). Yet in 
the very first theoretical move that sets things aside in order to focus on their 
‘objectness’, they are cut off from the flows that bring them to life. We saw this 
with the kite. To think of the kite as an object is to omit the wind – to forget 
that it is, in the first place, a kite-in-the-air. And so it seems that the kite’s flying 
is the result of an interaction between a person (the flyer) and an object (the 
kite), which can only be explained by imagining that the kite is endowed with 
an internal animating principle, an agency, that sets it in motion, most often 
contrary to the will of the flyer. More generally, I suggest that the problem of 
agency is born of the attempt to re-animate a world of things already deadened 
or rendered inert by arresting the flows of substance that give them life. In the 
EWO, things move and grow because they are alive, not because they have 
agency. And they are alive precisely because they have not been reduced to the 
status of objects. The idea that objects have agency is at best a figure of speech, 
forced on us (Anglophones at least) by the structure of a language that requires 
every verb of action to have a nominal subject. At worst it has led great minds to 
make fools of themselves in a way that we would be ill-advised to emulate. In 
effect, to render the life of things as the agency of objects is to effect a double 
reduction, of things to objects and of life to agency. The source of this reductive 
logic lies, I believe, is none other than the hylomorphic model.  
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Materials and materiality 
When analysts speak of the ‘material world’, or more abstractly, of ‘materiality’, 
what do they mean (Ingold 2007b)? What sense does it make to invoke the 
materiality of stones, trees, clouds, buildings or even kites? Put the question to 
students of material culture, and you are likely to get contradictory answers. 
Thus a stone, according to Christopher Tilley, can be regarded in its ‘brute 
materiality’, simply as a formless lump of matter. Yet we need a concept of 
materiality, he thinks, in order to understand how particular pieces of stone are 
given form and meaning within specific social and historical contexts (Tilley 2007: 
17). Likewise, archaeologist Joshua Pollard explains that ‘by materiality I mean 
how the material character of the world is comprehended, appropriated and 
involved in human projects’ (Pollard 2004: 48). We can recognise in both 
pronouncements the two sides of the hylomorphic model: on the one side, brute 
materiality or the world’s ‘material character’; on the other, the form-bestowing 
agency of human beings. In the concept of materiality the division between 
matter and form is reproduced rather than challenged. Indeed the very concept 
of material culture is a contemporary expression of the matter-form of 
hylomorphism. When Tilley writes of ‘brute materiality’, or archaeologist Bjørnar 
Olsen (2003: 88) of ‘the hard physicality of the world’, it is as if the world had 
ceased its worlding, and had crystallised out as a solid and homogeneous 
precipitate, awaiting its differentiation through the superimposition of cultural 
form. In such a stable and stabilised world, nothing flows. There can be no wind 
or weather, no rain to moisten the land or rivers running through it, no ‘rising 
up’ of the earth into plant or animal, indeed no life at all. There could be no 
things, only objects. 
  
In their attempts to rebalance the hylomorphic model, theorists have insisted 
that the material world is not passively subservient to human designs. Yet 
having arrested the flow of materials they can only comprehend activity, on the 
side of the material world, by attributing agency to objects. Pollard, however, 
sounds a note of dissent. Concluding an important article on ‘the art of decay 
and the transformation of substance’, he points out that material things, like 
people, are processes, and that their real agency lies precisely in the fact that 
‘they cannot always be captured and contained’ (Pollard 2004: 60). As we have 
found, it is in the opposite of capture and containment, namely discharge and 
leakage, that we discover the life of things. Bearing this in mind, we can return 
to Deleuze and Guattari, who insist that whenever we encounter matter, ‘it is 
matter in movement, in flux, in variation’. And the consequence, they go on to 
assert, is that ‘this matter-flow can only be followed’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 
451). What Deleuze and Guattari here call a ‘matter-flow’, I would call a 
material. Accordingly, I recast the assertion as a simple rule of thumb: to follow 
the materials. The EWO, I contend, is not a material world but a world of 
materials, of matter in flux. To follow these materials is to enter into a world 
that is, so to speak, continually on the boil. Indeed, rather than comparing it to 
a giant museum or department store, in which objects are arrayed according to 
their attributes or provenance, it might be more helpful to imagine the world as 
a huge kitchen, well stocked with ingredients of all sorts. 
  
In the kitchen, stuff is mixed together in various combinations, generating new 
materials in the process which will in turn become mixed with other ingredients 
in an endless process of transformation. To cook, containers have to be opened, 
and their contents poured out. We have to take the lids off things. Faced with 
the anarchic proclivities of his or her materials, the cook has indeed to struggle 
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to retain some semblance of control over what is going on. Perhaps an even 
closer parallel might be drawn with the laboratory of the alchemist. The world 
according to alchemy, as art historian James Elkins explains, was not one of 
matter that might be described according to the principles of science, in terms of 
its atomic or molecular composition, but one of substances which were known 
by what they look and feel like, and by following what happens to them as they 
are mixed together, heated or cooled. Oils, for example, were not hydrocarbons 
but ‘what rose to the surface of a pot of stewing plants, or sat dark and fetid at 
the bottom of a pit of rotting horseflesh’. Alchemy, writes Elkins, ‘is the old 
science of struggling with materials, and not quite understanding what is 
happening’ (Elkins 2000: 19, 23). His point is that this, too, is what painters have 
always done, in their everyday work in the studio. Their knowledge was also one 
of substances, and these were often little different from those of the alchemical 
laboratory. Painter’s size, for example, was made from horses’ hooves, stags’ 
antlers and rabbit-skin, and paint has been mixed with beeswax, the milk of figs, 
and the resins of exotic plants. Pigments were obtained from a bizarre 
miscellany of ingredients, such as the small reddish insects that were boiled and 
dried in the sun to produce the deep red pigment known as carmine, or the 
vinegar and horse manure that was mixed with lead in clay pots to produce the 
best white paint. 
  
As practitioners in the EWO, the cook, the alchemist and the painter are in the 
business not so much of imposing form on matter as of bringing together 
diverse materials and combining or redirecting their flow in the anticipation of 
what might emerge. The same could also be said of the potter, as archaeologist 
Benjamin Alberti suggests in a fine study of ceramics from Northwest Argentina 
dating from the first millennium AD. It would be a mistake, Alberti argues, to 
assume that the pot is a fixed and stable object, bearing the imprint of cultural 
form upon the ‘obdurate’ matter of the physical world (Alberti 2007: 211). On 
the contrary, evidence suggests that pots were treated like bodies, and with the 
same concern: namely, to compensate for chronic instability, to shore up vessels 
for life against the ever-present susceptibility to leakage and discharge that 
threatens their dissolution or metamorphosis. As parts of the fabric of the EWO, 
pots are no more stable than bodies, but are constituted and held in place 
within flows of materials. Left to themselves, however, materials can run amok. 
Pots are smashed; bodies disintegrate. It takes effort and vigilance to keep 
things intact, whether they be pots or people. The same is true of the gardener, 
who likewise has to struggle to prevent the garden from turning into a jungle. 
  
Modern society, of course, is averse to such chaos. Yet however much it has tried, 
through feats of engineering, to construct a material world that matches its 
expectations – that is, a world of discrete, well-ordered objects – its aspirations 
are thwarted by life’s refusal to be contained. We might think that objects have 
outer surfaces, but wherever there are surfaces life depends on the continual 
exchange of materials across them. If, by ‘surfacing’ the earth or incarcerating 
bodies, we block that exchange, then nothing can live. In practice, however, 
such blockages can never be more than partial and provisional. The hard 
surfacing of the earth, for example, is perhaps the most salient characteristic of 
what we conventionally call the ‘built environment’. On a paved road or 
concrete foundation, nothing can grow, unless provisioned from remote sources. 
Yet even the most resistant of materials cannot forever withstand the effects of 
erosion and wear and tear. Thus the paved surface, attacked by roots from 
below and by the action of wind, rain and frost from above, eventually cracks 
and crumbles, allowing plant growth through to mingle and bind once again 
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with the light, air and moisture of the atmosphere. Wherever we choose to look, 
the active materials of life are winning out over the dead hand of materiality 
that would snuff it out.  
Improvisation and abduction 
By restoring things to life I have wanted to celebrate the creativity of what Klee 
called ‘form-giving’. It is important, however, to be precise about what I mean 
by creativity. Specifically, I am concerned to reverse a tendency, evident in much 
of the literature on art and material culture, to read creativity ‘backwards’, 
starting from an outcome in the form of a novel object and tracing it, through a 
sequence of antecedent conditions, to an unprecedented idea in the mind of an 
agent. This backwards reading is equivalent to what anthropologist Alfred Gell 
has called the abduction of agency. Every work of art, for Gell, is an ‘object’ that 
can be ‘related to a social agent in a distinctive, “art-like” way’ (Gell 1998: 13). 
By ‘art-like’, Gell means a situation in which it is possible to trace a chain of 
causal connections running from the object to the agent, whereby the former 
may be said to index the latter. To trace these connections is to perform the 
cognitive operation of abduction. From my earlier critique of the double 
reduction of things to objects, and of life to agency, it should be clear why I 
believe this view to be fundamentally mistaken. A work of art, I insist, is not an 
object but a thing, and as Klee argued, the role of the artist is not to reproduce 
a preconceived idea, novel or not, but to join with and follow the forces and 
flows of material that bring the form of the work into being. ‘Following’, as 
Deleuze and Guattari point out, ‘is not at all the same thing as reproducing’: 
whereas reproducing involves a procedure of iteration, following involves 
itineration (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 410). The artist – as also the artisan – is 
an itinerant, and his work is consubstantial with the trajectory of his or her own 
life. Moreover the creativity of the work lies in the forward movement that gives 
rise to things. To read things ‘forwards’ entails a focus not on abduction but on 
improvisation (Ingold and Hallam 2007: 3). 
  
To improvise is to follow the ways of the world, as they unfold, rather than to 
connect up, in reverse, a series of points already traversed. It is, as Deleuze and 
Guattari write, ‘to join with the World, or to meld with it. One ventures from 
home on the thread of a tune’ (2004: 344). Life, for Deleuze and Guattari, issues 
along such thread-lines. They call them ‘lines of flight’, or sometimes ‘lines of 
becoming’. Critically, however, these lines do not connect. ‘A line of becoming’, 
they write, ‘is not defined by the points it connects, or by the points that 
compose it; on the contrary, it passes between points, it comes up through the 
middle … A becoming is neither one nor two, nor the relation of the two; it is 
the in-between, the … line of flight … running perpendicular to both’ (ibid.: 
323). Thus in life as in music or painting, the movement of becoming – the 
growth of the plant from its seed, the issuing of the melody from the meeting 
of violin and bow, the motion of the brush and its trace – points are not joined 
so much as swept aside and rendered indiscernible by the current as it sweeps 
through. Life is open-ended: its impulse is not to reach a terminus but to keep 
on going. The plant, the musician or the painter, in keeping going, ‘hazards an 
improvisation’ (ibid.: 343). 
  
The thing, however, is not just one thread but a certain gathering together of 
the threads of life. Deleuze and Guattari call it a haecceity (ibid.: 290). But if 
every thing is such a bundle of lines, what becomes of our original concept of 
‘environment’? What is the meaning of environment in the EWO? Literally, an 
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environment is what surrounds a thing, yet you cannot surround anything 
without wrapping it up, converting the very threads along which life is lived into 
boundaries within which it is contained. Instead let us imagine ourselves, as did 
Charles Darwin in The Origin of Species, standing before ‘the plants and bushes 
clothing an entangled bank’ (Darwin 1950 [1859]: 64). Observe how the fibrous 
bundles comprising every plant and bush are entwined with one another so as 
to form a dense matt of vegetation. What we have been used to calling ‘the 
environment’ reappears on the bank as an immense tangle of lines. Precisely 
such a view was advanced by the Swedish geographer Torsten Hägerstrand, who 
imagined every constituent of the environment – humans, animals, plants, 
stones, buildings – as having a continuous trajectory of becoming. As they move 
through time and encounter one another, the trajectories of diverse 
constituents are bundled together in diverse combinations. ‘Seen from within’, 
wrote Hägerstrand, ‘one could think of the tips of trajectories as sometimes 
being pushed forward by forces behind and sometimes having eyes looking 
around and arms reaching out, at every moment asking “what shall I do next”?’ 
The entwining of these ever-extending trajectories, in Hägerstrand’s terms, 
comprises the texture of the world – the ‘big tapestry of Nature which history is 
weaving’ (Hägerstrand 1976: 332). Like Darwin’s entangled bank, Hägerstrand’s 
tapestry is a field not of interconnected points but of interwoven lines, not a 
network but what I shall call a meshwork. 
Network and meshwork 
I have borrowed the term ‘meshwork’ from the philosophy of Henri Lefebvre. 
There is something in common, Lefebvre observes, between the way in which 
words are inscribed on a page of writing, and the way in which the movements 
and rhythms of human and non-human activity are registered in lived space, but 
only if we think of writing not as a verbal composition but as a tissue of lines – 
not as text but as texture. ‘Practical activity writes on nature’, he remarks, ‘in a 
scrawling hand’ (Lefebvre 1991: 117). Think of the reticular trails left by people 
and animals as they go about their business around the house, village and town. 
Caught in these multiple entanglements, every monument or building is more 
‘archi-textural’ than architectural. It too, despite its apparent permanence and 
solidity, is a haecceity, experienced processionally in the vistas, occlusions and 
transitions that unfold along the myriad pathways inhabitants take, from room 
to room and in and out of doors, as they go about their daily tasks. This goes 
back to Pallasmaa’s observation that our architectural experience is primarily 
verbal rather than nominal. As the life of inhabitants overflows into gardens 
and streets, fields and forests, so the world pours into the building, giving rise to 
characteristic echoes of reverberation and patterns of light and shade. It is in 
these flows and counter-flows, winding through or amidst without beginning or 
end, and not as connected entities bounded either from within or without, that 
things are instantiated in the world of the EWO. 
  
The distinction between the lines of flow of the meshwork and the lines of 
connection of the network is critical. Yet it has been persistently obscured, 
above all in the recent elaboration of what has come to be known, rather 
unfortunately, as ‘actor network theory’. The theory has its roots not in thinking 
about the environment but in the sociological study of science and technology. 
In this latter field, much of its appeal comes from its promise to describe 
interactions among people (such as scientists and engineers) and the objects 
with which they deal (such as in the laboratory) in a way that does not 
concentrate agency in human hands, but rather takes it to be distributed around 
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all the elements that are connected or mutually implicated in a field of action. 
The term ‘actor-network’, however, first entered the Anglophone literature as a 
translation from the French acteur réseau. And as one of its leading proponents 
– Bruno Latour – has observed in hindsight, the translation gave it a significance 
that was never intended. In vernacular usage, inflected by innovations in 
information and communications technology, the defining attribute of the 
network is connectivity (Latour 1999: 15). But réseau can refer as well to netting 
as to network – to woven fabric, the tracery of lace, the plexus of the nervous 
system or the web of the spider. 
  
The lines of the spider’s web, for example, unlike those of the communications 
network, do not connect points or join things up. They are rather spun from 
materials exuded from the spider’s body and are laid down as it moves about. In 
that sense they are extensions of the spider’s very being as it trails into the 
environment (Ingold 2008: 210-11). They are the lines along which it lives, and 
conduct its perception and action in the world. Now the acteur réseau was 
intended by its originators (if not by those who have been misled by its 
translation as ‘network’) to be comprised of just such lines of becoming. Their 
inspiration came, in large measure, from the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari. 
And these authors are quite explicit that although the value of the web for the 
spider is that it catches flies, the line of the web does not link the spider to the 
fly, nor does the fly’s ‘line of flight’ link it to the spider. These two lines rather 
unfold in counterpoint: to the one, the other serves as a refrain. Ensconced at 
the centre of its web, the spider registers that a fly has landed somewhere on 
the outer margins, as it sends vibrations down the threads that are picked up by 
the spider’s super-sensitive, spindly legs. And it can then run along the lines of 
the web to retrieve its prey. Thus the thread-lines of the web lay down the 
conditions of possibility for the spider to interact with the fly. But they are not 
themselves lines of interaction. If these lines are relations, then they are 
relations not between but along. 
  
Of course, as with the spider, the lives of things generally extend along not one 
but multiple lines, knotted together at the centre but trailing innumerable 
‘loose ends’ at the periphery. Thus each should be pictured, as Latour has latterly 
suggested, in the shape of a star ‘with a center surrounded by many radiating 
lines, with all sorts of tiny conduits leading to and fro’ (Latour 2005: 177). No 
longer a self-contained object, the thing now appears as an ever-ramifying web 
of lines of growth. This is the haecceity of Deleuze and Guattari, famously 
likened by them to a rhizome (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 290). Personally, I 
prefer the image of the fungal mycelium (Rayner 1997). Whichever image we 
prefer, what is crucial is that we start from the fluid character of the life process, 
wherein boundaries are sustained only thanks to the flow of materials across 
them. In the science of mind, the absoluteness of the boundary between body 
and environment has not gone unquestioned. Over fifty years ago, the pioneer 
of psychological anthropology, A. Irving Hallowell, argued that ‘any inner-outer 
dichotomy, with the human skin as boundary, is psychologically irrelevant’ (1955: 
88), a view echoed by the anthropologist Gregory Bateson in a lecture delivered 
in 1970, in which he declared that ‘the mental world – the mind – the world of 
information processing – is not limited by the skin’ (Bateson 1973: 429). Much 
more recently, philosopher Andy Clark has made the same point. The mind, 
Clark tells us, is a ‘leaky organ’ that will not be confined within the skull but 
mingles with the body and the world in the conduct of its operations (Clark 1997: 
53). More strictly, he should have said that the skull is leaky, whereas the mind is 
what leaks! Be that as it may, what I have tried to do here is to return to 
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Bateson’s declaration and take it one step further. I want to suggest that it is 
not just the mind that leaks, but things in general. And they do so along the 
paths we follow as we trace the flows of materials in the EWO. 
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